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Hierarchies of Discrimination in Baby Making?
A Response to Professor Carroll
RADHIKA RAO*
First, I applaud Professor Carroll’s effort to examine these issues through the
lens of equality rather than through the lens of liberty.1 I myself advocated such an
approach in Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive
Equality.2 The reason for the turn to equality is that the prospect of discrimination
with respect to assisted reproductive technologies is very troubling, but finding a
fundamental right to procreate with the assistance of reproductive technology and
reproductive collaborators goes much too far. Such an approach would appear to
invalidate almost every law restricting access to the technology or the materials
necessary for procreation, including laws limiting the number of in vitro embryos
that could be implanted in a woman’s body at the same time, or even laws
proscribing reproductive cloning.
Professor Carroll may be correct when she contends that it does not matter
whether or not there is a fundamental right to procreate that encompasses
surrogacy, if marital status discrimination with respect to surrogacy is not rationally
related to any legitimate governmental purpose.3 That was clearly true of Italy’s
Law 40, which confined use of ARTs to married or “stable” heterosexual couples
while at the same time denying use of the technology to single persons and
homosexuals.4 Italy’s marital status requirement could not be justified as protecting
children by ensuring that they are born into stable two-parent families because the
law permitted unmarried but “stable” heterosexual couples access to ARTs, yet
refused to extend the same privileges to equally stable homosexual couples.
Stripped of the familial stability rationale, such a law fails any level of review and
hence should be deemed unconstitutional: it is revealed as resting solely upon
societal disapproval or prejudice, rather than any legitimate governmental interest.
But is marital status discrimination always irrational? Professor Mutcherson
points out that there may be good reasons to restrict surrogacy to married couples:
A state that draws a marital status distinction . . . could persuasively
argue that it is using marriage as a shorthand or proxy for other
elements that the state prefers to see when people engage in a process
with the end goal of creating a child for whom the state has an
obligation to provide protection.5

* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. See Andrea B. Carroll, Discrimination in Baby Making: The Unconstitutional
Treatment of Prospective Parents Through Surrogacy, 88 IND. L.J. 1187 (2013).
2. Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive
Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457 (2008).
3. See Carroll, supra note 1, at 1197.
4. See Rao, supra note 2, at 1458–59.
5. Kimberly M. Mutcherson, How Parents Are Made: A Response to Discrimination in
Baby Making: The Unconstitutional Treatment of Prospective Parents Through Surrogacy,
88 IND. L.J. 1207, 1215 (2013).
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A direct inquiry into the economic and emotional stability of the parties who intend
to parent a child is difficult to conduct, so states could use marriage as a substitute
to determine who should have access to surrogacy. And if this rationale provides
the real basis for the state’s restriction of surrogacy to married couples and is
applied evenhandedly,6 then Professor Mutcherson is absolutely correct to conclude
that “[t]he state . . . is not drawing baseless distinctions but is using data to help
discern what circumstances are most likely to produce the familial stability that
children need.”7 But if marital status is not a proxy for gauging familial stability but
a pretext for other, more invidious forms of discrimination, then it may not survive
rational basis review—at least not the rigorous form of rational basis review
applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas,8 or by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.9 Thus, the
case against marital status discrimination is much more difficult and complicated
than Professor Carroll’s paper would seem to suggest.
But the flaws in Professor Carroll’s analysis go even further. While arguing
eloquently against one form of discrimination—discrimination on the basis of
marital status—Professor Carroll implicitly endorses and even encourages another
kind of discrimination by drawing a bright line between traditional and gestational
surrogacy.10 In so doing, Professor Carroll substitutes one category of
discrimination for another, effectively favoring genetic over gestational mothers.
Professor Carroll contrasts traditional surrogacy, which would “force[] a genetic
mother to comply with an agreement she made, in advance of a child’s birth . . . to
relinquish her own child,”11 with gestational surrogacy, asserting that “[t]he same
risks and societal concerns do not necessarily arise in this alternate form of
surrogacy”12 because “[i]n gestational surrogacy, the surrogate merely acts as a
carrier for the child. Her role is gestational in nature, and, by definition, she is not
genetically related to the child she gestates, who is the genetic child of the intended
parents.”13 Professor Carroll is not alone in her stance: several states appear to
apply a similar approach by refusing to enforce traditional surrogacy contracts
while at the same time sanctioning gestational surrogacy.14 The Uniform Parentage

6. See Rao, supra note 2, at 1476 (suggesting that the familial stability rationale does
not warrant discrimination against “married homosexuals, who exhibit as much stability and
commitment as married heterosexuals”).
7. Mutcherson, supra note 5, at 1215.
8. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
9. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
10. See Carroll, supra note 1, at 1190–1191.
11. Id. at 1190 (emphasis added).
12. Id.
13. Id. (footnote omitted).
14. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 63.212–.213, 742.15–.16 (West 2010, 2012 & Supp. 2013)
(distinguishing between gestational surrogacy contracts, which are enforced if one of the
intended parents is genetically related to the child, and traditional surrogacy, called a
“preplanned adoption agreement,” under which the birth mother is given forty-eight hours
after birth to change her mind); Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 45/6, 47/10–70, 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 535/12 (West 2009, 2011) (enforcing
gestational surrogacy contracts while remaining silent on the status of traditional surrogacy);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045 (2010) (enforcing gestational surrogacy contracts); N.D.
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Act (UPA) also adopts this position by recommending that gestational surrogacy
contracts should be deemed enforceable and effective to transfer parental rights,
while leaving the status of traditional surrogacy in legal limbo.15 Thus, disparate
treatment of these two types of surrogacy appears to be accepted without question
under current law.16
But why should the law treat gestational surrogacy so differently from
traditional surrogacy? Professor Carroll provides scant justification or explanation
besides her assertion that “[i]n a gestational surrogacy, the surrogate does not have
any genetic connection to the child, making the relinquishment bargain she makes
less offensive.”17 Is Professor Carroll implying that parenthood is determined by
genetic ties rather than by gestational connections, so that a woman who gestates
without a genetic connection would not be deemed the legal mother of the child?
This appears to be the unspoken premise underlying her pronouncement that a
gestational surrogate should be deemed a mere “carrier” and not the real mother of
the child.18 But as a factual matter, this is not necessarily true. Indeed, most states
CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to -08; 14-19-01; 14-20-01 to -66 (2009) (distinguishing between
gestational surrogacy contracts, which are legal and enforceable, and traditional surrogacy
contracts, which are void and unenforceable); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801 to -809
(LexisNexis 2012) (permitting gestational surrogacy contracts while prohibiting traditional
surrogacy); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.751–.763 (2008) (explicitly allowing gestational
surrogacy as long as the surrogate does not use her own eggs).
15. Article 8 of the UPA substitutes the term “gestational mother” for “surrogate
mother,” the term that was previously used, on the grounds that “gestational mother” is a
more appropriate term because it includes both a woman who gestates a child without being
that child’s genetic mother and a woman who is both the genetic and gestational mother.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 77 (Supp. 2012). Thus,
although the UPA uses the term “gestational mother,” it defines gestational mother
inclusively to include a woman who may also possess a genetic connection to the child.
However, the comments to this section of the UPA make it clear that the term “gestational
mother” was deliberately selected because the majority of ART practitioners try to avoid the
scenario in which a woman supplies both egg and womb on the rationale that “the
gestational mother’s genetic link to the child too often creates additional emotional and
psychological problems in enforcing a gestational agreement.” Id.
16. Professor Elizabeth Scott carefully describes how and why the social and political
meanings of surrogacy have changed over the last decades and the process by which
gestational surrogacy became normalized, pointing out that “[t]he move to gestational
surrogacy has facilitated the change in the social meaning of surrogacy from a mother’s sale
of her baby to a transaction involving the provision of gestational services. It is telling that
gestational surrogates are often described as ‘carriers,’ rather than as ‘mothers.’” Elizabeth
S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109,
140 (2009); see also June Carbone, Negating the Genetic Tie: Does the Law Encourage
Unnecessary Risks?, 79 UMKC L. REV. 333, 335 (2010) (“[T]he acceptance of surrogacy,
legally and practically, followed from the separation of genetic and gestational motherhood.
While the initial cases frowned on the practice, modern law in states that range from Texas
to Illinois and Virginia to California and Florida expressly authorizes the practice.
Psychological and legal acceptance closely followed the change in the nature of the genetic
relationship.”).
17. Carroll, supra note 1, at 1191.
18. See Scott, supra note 16, at 141 (“The relatively positive response to gestational
surrogacy suggests that gestational motherhood is devalued when it is separated from genetic
parenthood—and perhaps that surrogates who are not also genetic mothers, unlike traditional
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have statutes which presume that the woman who gives birth is the legal mother of
the child.19 Moreover, even in Johnson v. Calvert,20 the most famous gestational
surrogacy case, the California Supreme Court ruled that both the woman who
provided the egg and the woman who gestated had provided sufficient evidence of
maternity to be deemed the biological mother of the resulting child.21 In that case,
the court used intent as a tiebreaker to determine which of these two women should
be deemed the legal mother of the child, awarding custody to the genetic parents
rather than the gestational surrogate.22 But if a woman gestated a child conceived
with the egg of another with the intention of rearing the child as her own, the
California Supreme Court would have declared the gestator to be the legal mother
of the child.23 Surely, Professor Carroll does not mean to suggest that, in such a
case, a gestational mother who lacks a genetic connection should be treated as a
legal stranger to her child?
Perhaps Professor Carroll believes that enforcement of the relinquishment
bargain made by a gestational surrogate is less offensive because gestational
surrogates who lack a genetic connection generally feel less attachment to the
resulting child. Yet this may not always be the case. For many women, gestation
rather than genetics may be the source of their maternal bond with the child.
Indeed, the Supreme Court relied upon the strength of the gestational connection
between mother and child to justify a gender-based citizenship presumption that
essentially discriminated against genetic fathers.24 Professor Carroll does not really
defend her assumption that one biological connection—the genetic tie—should
trump the other biological connection with the child, nor does she provide a reason
why we should privilege genes over gestation. Indeed, it could be argued that an
approach that favors the genetic tie over the lengthy and arduous physical process
of gestation and childbirth ironically replicates the wrongs of patriarchy, which
typically denigrated or dismissed the importance of women’s unique contributions
while exalting the male role in providing the seed and ultimately viewing children
as the genetic property of their fathers. Of course, Professor Carroll’s approach is
more egalitarian in its conclusion that children should be viewed as the genetic
property of both the male and female progenitors!
Are there good reasons for the law to prefer gestational surrogacy to traditional
surrogacy? Some might suggest that the prevalence of gestational surrogacy
contracts today reflects widespread parental preferences—people prefer to have
surrogates, might be expected not to form a maternal bond with a child who ‘belongs’ to
others.” (emphasis in original)).
19. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Jus Sanguinis: Determining Citizenship for Assisted
Reproduction Children Born Overseas 18 (March 26, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2181026 (pointing out that State Department policy
conflicts with the law in most states, which generally presume that the woman who gives
birth to a child is the child’s mother); see also Carbone, supra note 16, at 338.
20. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
21. Id. at 782.
22. Id.
23. See id.
24. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding gender-based presumption that
automatically awarded U.S. citizenship to children born to citizen-mothers, while requiring
proof of an actual connection in order to confer citizenship upon the genetic children of
citizen-fathers).
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children who are the product of their own genes, rather than the genes of others.25
But if so, why should the law simply ratify such private preferences? Moreover,
intending parents often choose gestational surrogacy even when the child is not the
product of their own eggs and sperm but of donated gametes. This suggests that the
preference for gestational surrogacy is a consequence of legal regulation rather than
the cause—the preference for gestational surrogacy may actually be the result of
legal rules that clearly enforce gestational surrogacy contracts while leaving open
the status of traditional surrogacy. If this is so, then the desire to disconnect the
genetic and the gestational components of motherhood may be an artifact of the
law. Disentangling the various elements of reproduction makes it more difficult to
label a gestational surrogate as a “mother” whose claims to the child may trump
those of the intending parents.26 Thus, the fragmentation of parenthood into
multiple parts may serve no purpose other than to alienate women from the
products of their labor—figuratively and literally—in order to facilitate the transfer
of legal rights to the resulting children.
Moreover, if there is good reason to distinguish between these two forms of
surrogacy, one could argue that the result should be exactly the other way around.
Gestational surrogacy, because it requires in vitro fertilization, is more risky and
invasive than traditional surrogacy. In vitro fertilization requires ingestion of drugs
to hyperstimulate a woman’s ovaries, encouraging the release of multiple eggs
which will be retrieved through laparoscopy, a procedure in which a lengthy needle
is inserted in a woman’s navel.27 And fertilization of these eggs with sperm occurs
externally in a petri dish, rather than inside the womb. All of these procedures
entail certain risks to both women and children, and they are also much more
expensive than artificial insemination. If protecting health and safety is the primary
purpose of regulation, then the law should promote traditional surrogacy over
gestational surrogacy. Yet disparate legal treatment of these two forms of surrogacy
actually seems to have prompted a shift from the cheaper and less invasive,
low-tech procedure of artificial insemination to the risky and expensive high-tech
alternative, not for any good reasons, but arguably because of unthinking
stereotypes and prejudices that endow genes with greater significance than other
biological connections and envision a gestational surrogate as a mere “carrier” and
not the real mother.

25. Professor Carbone suggests that the separation of genetic and gestational parenthood
might also be the result of intending parents’ desire to negate unwanted genetic ties. See
Carbone, supra note 16, at 338.
26. Cf. I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1135 (2008) (arguing that there is no “naked” right not to be a genetic parent,
unbundled from the obligations of gestational and legal parenthood).
27. Radhika Rao, Coercion, Commercialization, and Commodification: The Ethics of
Compensation for Egg Donors in Stem Cell Research, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1055, 1058
& n.13 (2006).

